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Introduction
There has been renewed interest in state fragility by scholars and international development agencies. It has been substantially documented that, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is one of the regions in the world that eloquently reflects characteristics of state fragility 2 : weak governments, insufficient security and legal frameworks, ineffective administration, poor public services, high rates of conflicts and civil wars, growing extreme poverty, inter alia There is increasing evidence on the persistent character of the phenomenon of state fragility. In fact, the probability that a country that was classified as fragile in the year 2001 remains in the same category in 2009 is 0.95. Accordingly, the 35 countries that were 2 The present study is an extension of Bertocchi & Guerzoni (2012) for two main reasons: on the one hand, we are using the same data base and; on the other hand, we are integrating a dimension not taken into account by Bertocchi & Guerzoni. In SSA, states are not only fragile; many can also be qualified as "Nation-Building" (Green & Bandyopadhyay, 2012) . Notwithstanding country-specific 'nation-building' and management processes, African states are also the result of politico-economic equilibriums (Green, 2012ab 4 . In such a social dynamic, our postulated hypothesis which is not incompatible with Besley & Persson (2009 ) is justified. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the data. The empirical results and corresponding discussion are covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Data
It is well acknowledged that fragility as discussed in the preceding section is a complex and multidimensional concept. In spite of the significant common characteristics in 4 We For the purpose of this paper, to refer to CPIA ratings 5 offer three main advantages.
Firstly, the ratings have a crucial practical relevance, since as previously stated; they substantially affect aid allocation according to a specific formula. Secondly, information on 5 CPIA ratings are annually prepared by the WB staff and are intended to capture the quality of a country's policies and institutional arrangements, with a focus on the key elements that are within the country's control, rather than on the outcomes (such as growth rates) that are influenced by elements without the country's control. Scores are assigned on the basis of sixteen criteria (20 until 2003) which are grouped in four equally weighted clusters: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity and, public management and institutions. Accordingly, the ratios mirror a variety of indicators, observations and, judgments based on country knowledge (originating from the WB and elsewhere) and on relevant publicly available indicators.
their distribution by quintiles is now available for a relatively extended time period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . Thirdly, owing to their design, they do not mechanically reflect any of the variables we employ as regressors, so they can safely be employed to define our outcome variable 6 . We construct a dataset of 41 sub-Saharan countries for which we have relevant data from the CPIA ratio distributions by quintiles. For the selected countries, we defined a fragility dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a country belongs to the bottom two CPIA quintiles or if it is not rated, 0 otherwise. could be in the hands of the military, the clergy, land owners, the business world, inter alia;
with the capacity to partially deviate from the democratic system without questioning it altogether. These actors can block the implementation of democratic decisions or preserve certain prerogatives (like the nomination of the chief of command in the arms forces). This point does not refer to the existence of the state itself. Hence, Guerilla movements, paramilitaries or outside the state (suburbs or rural zones) do not make-up the blockages outlined in the indicator. Accordingly, the indicator is evaluated by a scale of 1 to 10. The 6 In spite of the above considerations, it should be noted that, the CPIA ratings are not criticism-free. Doubts have been raised both on the methodology of the assessments and the confidence with which they should be used as a basis for aid allocation. A common criticism put forward is that, they implicitly rely on a uniform model of what counts in development (Kanbur, 2005) . Another issue raised has been transparency and accountability which could be addressed more accurately. Some have professed that; the lack of reliable information may prevent objective assessments by the WB staff. To this effect, the WB Independent Evaluation Group (2010) has recently reviewed the ratings and proposed recommendations for revision.
higher the scale, the more there is a true capacity to govern and hence, less interferences linked to rent seeking and lobbying. When data is not available for a given country, we resort to the estimation in the note proposed by the Mo Foundation.
In which have a behavior that is modeled by natural resources. Simply put, a country is qualified as rich in the list when rents resulting from primary products exceed 30% of GDP. Hence, on the basis of this criterion, South Africa is not classified as rich in natural resources. and a robustness check with Logistic regressions without interactions (in the third column).
Regression Results

Without interactions
The results of the former regression specifications are broadly consistent with those of the latter specifications.
From the Probit estimation output, the following findings could be established. (1) The level of education, life expectancy, the degree of ethnic fractionalization and the weight of natural resources all insignificantly increase government effectiveness and hence, insignificantly reduce the probability of state fragility. (2) The fertility rate, government expenditure and per capita economic prosperity insignificantly mitigate government effectiveness and corrolarily; insignificantly increase the probability of state fragility.
Political interference and revolutions significantly reduce and increase government effectiveness respectively. Hence, increasing and reducing the probability of state fragility respectively. While a unit change in revolutions increases by more than 68% the probability of government effectiveness, a unit change political interference mitigates the same probability by about 1%. It is worth noting that, the effect of our variable of interest is highly significant. Political interferences in the forms of rent seeking and lobbying decrease (increase) the probability of effective governance (a country entering a situation of state fragility). Hence, an increase by 10% in governing capacity due to a decrease in political interferences also decreases the probability of state fragility by the corresponding percentage. From the estimations in Model 1, of the 25 countries that experienced state fragility crisis, 20 have been rightly predicted (with a probability higher than 0.5), while for countries that did not experience such a crisis, 34 of the 40 have been well predicted. In other words, the prediction rate of our model is at the height of 83.08%.
The third column entails a logit model. Its specification is simply a replication of the the model in the first column. This gymnastic is a purely for robustness purposes, which is the reason we have not reported the marginal effects. Accordingly, but for a slight variation in the significance of the revolution variable, the logit results are broadly consistent with the probit findings. Hence, political interference and revolutions significantly reduce and increase the probability of governing capacity respectively. This conclusion is empirically in accordance with what Green (2011) qualifies as "Tanzania exceptionalism": the success of Tanzania in the formation of a nation and prevention of ethnic conflicts. Accordingly, the logit model serves as a robustness check. Based on the results, the following conclusions could be drawn. (1) The significance and signs of the estimated coefficients as well as the corresponding marginal effects are broadly consistent with those in Table 1 . (2) The logit model estimations are also consistent with the probit specification output. (3) While the interaction of 'rent seeking and revolution' increases the probability of effective governance, the interaction between 'rent seeking and natural resources' does not have a significant positive incidence on the effectiveness of government. Hence, while the former interaction decreases the probability of state fragility, the latter does not have a significant negative effect on the probability of dissolving the state into chaos. (4) The marginal effect of the significant interaction term is around the height of 1%; implying a unit change in the interaction between 'rent seeking and revolution' increases the probability of government effectiveness by 1.31%. Hence, the inherent negative mechanism of revolution outweighs the established positive effect of rent seeking on state fragility. More so, the fact that rent seeking in 'resource'-rich countries has no significant negative incidence on the probability of state fragility is an indication that, the presence of natural resources somewhat attenuates the ability of rent seeking to independently increase the probability of state fragility. (5) The prediction rates for Model 1 and Model 3 are 87.69% and 83.08% respectively. 
Results with interactions
Tableau 2. Estimation with interactions
Extreme state fragility
Bertocchi & Guerzoni (2011, 2012) have constructed another proxy for extreme state fragility. This is simply a restriction of the fragility criterion from bottom two quintiles to the the bottom quintiles. Hence, in a hypothetical situation of extreme state fragility, the binary variables assume the value of 1 for IDA countries in the bottom CPIA quintile or without a CPIA rating, otherwise 0.
The estimations in Table 3 Ultimately, in terms of the tested hypothesis, the results in Table 3 are broadly consistent with those in Tables 1-2 . With regard to the other control variables, the expected changes could be observed. education on the probability of state fragility is logical because, literacy reinforces the constant quest for democratic institutions (and quality of government). The positive incidence of per capita economic prosperity on the probability of state fragility is logical from the perspective that, citizens would most probably engage in moves that threaten stability (political and economic) if they are unevenly benefiting from the fruits of national economic prosperity. Even if the fruits of economic prosperity are evenly distributed, democracy and quality of government do not come with direct economic prosperity, but with respect to the time and level hypotheses (Asongu, 2011) 7 . The positive incidence of demographic pressures 7 Moreover, as sustained by the literature (Asongu, 2012b; Dixit, 2004) , attempts to effect the transition from informal to formal institutions is somehow complex since the introduction of top-down formal institutions have not fared well in the complicated maze of bottom-up arrangements. Dixit (2004) has presented an interesting argument as to how introducing imperfect rule-based institutions could actually make things worse, as they create outside opportunities for members of relationship based networks. Network members can then cheat on their partners and vamoose to operate in the rule-based system. A society could get caught in-between formal and informal institutional settings with neither working well.
on the probability of a country descending into chaos could have a twofold justification: the absence of preemptive measures by authorities to satisfy the burgeoning population with policies that guarantee some hope for a bright future and; the willingness of the citizens to engage in activities that guarantee some hopes for the future generation and posterity. The 
Conclusion
This paper has assessed the determinants of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa using hitherto unexplored variables in the literature. The previously missing dimension of nation building has been integrated and the hypothesis of state fragility being a function of rent seeking and/or lobbying by de facto power holders has been tested. The resulting interesting finding is that, political interference, rent seeking and lobbying increase the probability of state fragility by mitigating the effectiveness of governance capacity. This relationship (after controlling for a range of economic, institutional and demographic factors) is consistent with a plethora of models and specifications. The validity of the hypothesis is confirmed in a scenario of extreme state fragility. Moreover, the interaction between political interferences and revolutions mitigate the probability of state fragility while the interaction between natural resources and political interferences breeds the probability of extreme state fragility. As a policy implication, there is a 'sub-Saharan African specificity' in 'nation building' and prevention of conflicts. Blanket fragility oriented policies will be misplaced unless they are
